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TO CHARGE OR NOT TO CHARGE, THAT IS   
DISCRETION:  THE PROBLEM OF PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION IN CHILE, AND JAPAN’S SOLUTION 
 
 
Kirtland C. Marsh† 
 
 
Abstract: Chile’s recent criminal procedure reform is an ambitious program to 
bring greater transparency, fairness, and effectiveness to the country’s legal system.  
However, the success of the reform is not assured.  To a great extent, the reform’s 
success will depend on the new national Office of the Public Prosecutor’s ability to 
enforce laws and direct law enforcement within the confines of the new system.  
Prosecutors must balance the interests of the Chilean public’s demands for order and 
convictions with the reform’s underlying principles of impartiality and enhanced rights 
for defendants.  If prosecutors resort to the excesses used by investigating judges under 
the old system, the reform’s goal of enhanced defendant rights will be thwarted.  On the 
other hand, if prosecutors are unable to secure convictions and adequately direct law 
enforcement, Chileans will lose faith in the viability of the new system.  Chile’s criminal 
procedure reform can succeed, but it will depend a great deal upon skillful use of 
prosecutorial discretion in charging cases.  In crafting a viable solution to the challenge 
of managing prosecutorial discretion, Chile should look to the model of Japan’s 
prosecution review commissions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  On June 16, 2005, the final phase of Chile’s criminal procedure 
reform went into effect, culminating a revolution in the country’s criminal 
justice system and marking a significant milestone in Chile’s transition to 
modern democracy.1  During the past twenty years, Chile has undergone a 
dramatic transformation admired throughout the region and the world.  As 
an extension of that transformation, Chile’s movement to reform its Code of 
Criminal Procedure was driven by its desire to be “on the same standing as 
other nations of the world, whose justice systems have efficient ways of 
protecting [individual] rights and liberties.”2 
  Firmly established as an important trading partner with countries in 
Asia and North America, Chile has emerged as one of the most dynamic 
                                                 
†
  J.D., expected 2007.  The author wishes to thank Professor Helen Anderson and the editorial staff 
of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their valuable assistance.  
1
  Ronald Abramson, After the Revolution, It’s Time to Arm the Lawyers, 9 PIERCE L. MAG. 2 (2005), 
http://www.resources.piercelaw.edu/pubs/PLwin05vol9no1/2-5.pdf.  
2
  Claudio Pavlic, Legal Reform: The Role of Public Institutions and Legal Culture, 35 CAL. W. 
INT’L L.J. 237, 256 (2005) (a supervising public defender under a new system in Chile, speaking at a 
symposium at California Western School of Law); see also CÓDIGO PROCESAL PENAL [Code of Criminal 
Procedure], available at http://www.defensoriapenal.cl/archivos /1132775062.pdf. 
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countries in the Pacific Rim.3  According to a recent United Nations study, 
the rapid rise in Chileans’ standard of living in the past decade is nearly 
without comparison worldwide.4  Chile has been described as “the Asian 
economy in the heart of Latin America.”5  Much of Chile’s success can be 
traced to its successful engagement with its trading partners in the Pacific 
Rim. 6 
  Developing countries throughout Latin America and the Pacific region 
look to Chile as a successful model of government reform.7  While many 
other Latin American countries struggle to achieve full democracy and 
sustained economic growth, the “Chilean model” is praised throughout the 
region as a successful example of development.8  With a robust economy 
that grew at seven percent in the 1990s and five percent in 2005,9 Chile has 
become the most prosperous country in South America.10  In many respects, 
Chile has successfully transformed itself into the “crown jewel of Latin 
America.”11  The World Economic Forum, in a report released in September 
of 2005 ranked Chile twenty-third internationally in terms of economic 
                                                 
3
  See MARY LOU LATHROP, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE PORTS INDUSTRY SECTOR: CHILE (Sept. 
7, 2002), http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri.nsf/en/gr111423e.html. Chile’s growth is firmly 
rooted in its burgeoning trade with other Pacific nations.  With a Pacific coastline of nearly 4000 miles 
strategically located on the southwest coast of South America, Chile is considered the continent’s door to 
the South Pacific and Asia.  Chile represents the ideal point of transfer for trade between South America 
and trading partners in Australia, New Zealand, the Far East, North America and Central America. See also 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK, FIELD LISTING – EXPORTS - PARTNERS (Jan. 10, 
2006), http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2050.html (noting that Chile’s top four export 
partners in 2004 were all Pacific Rim countries: the United States (14%), Japan (11.4%), China (9.9%), 
South Korea (5.5%)).   
4
  Rob Foulkes, Chile Jumps Six Places in United Nations Development Report, THE SANTIAGO 
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005 (quoting Chilean Sociologist, Aldo Mascareño: “Chile is one of the countries that has 
registered the greatest improvement in terms of human development.  In this sense, it is comparable only to 
Hong Kong, which is 22nd in the U.N. report”). 
5
  Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, Chile and Singapore: The Individual and the Collective, A 
Comparison, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 739, 791 (1998) (quoting David Pilling, Keeping an Eye on the Old 
Tiger – The Emerging Investor, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1993, at 24). 
6
  Chile’s expanding Pacific trade led to its invitation to become one of the first Latin American 
countries to enter the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation trade group (“APEC”), a multilateral trade 
forum.  See Zahralddin-Aravena, supra note 5, at 791.   With 21 member economies around the Pacific 
Rim, APEC’s members account for more than 2.5 billion people, a combined gross domestic product of 
U.S. $19 trillion and 47% of world trade.  See APEC, ABOUT APEC, http://www.apec .org/apec/ 
about_apec.html  (last visited Sept. 25, 2005) (inclusion in the group and hosting the annual APEC Forum 
in 2004 are expected by the Chilean government to have a major impact on Chile’s future development). 
7
  Zahralddin-Aravena, supra note 5, at 846-47. 
8
  Writing the Next Chapter in a Latin American Success Story, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2005, at 48. 
9
  Id.  
10
 See Zahralddin-Aravena, supra note 5, at 790; see also Writing the Next Chapter in a Latin 
American Success Story, supra note 8 (commenting that if Chile continues the rate of growth it has enjoyed 
during the past decade for another ten years, it will reach the same level of income per person as European 
Union countries like Greece and Portugal).  
11
  Abramson, supra note 1, at 2.  
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competitiveness, far ahead of the next-ranked Latin American country, 
Uruguay, at fifty-fourth.12   
  Sometimes regarded internationally as a “good house in a bad 
neighbourhood,”13 Chile is carefully studied by its neighbors.  Other Latin 
American countries have attempted judicial reform in response to 
dissatisfied electorates but have had mixed success.14  If Chile can 
successfully implement its criminal procedure reform, the effects could 
reverberate throughout South American legal systems.   
  Chile has implemented numerous reforms to strengthen its 
democracy.  Among these reforms are its Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation, which was founded to address the brutal crimes of the 
Pinochet regime.15   In September 2005, Chile drafted a new constitution,16 
which promises to further strengthen the country’s democratic institutions 
and reduce the armed forces’ power over the government, a vestige of the 
Pinochet era.17  As pivotal as these reforms have been to Chilean society, the 
wholesale reform of Chile’s Code of Criminal Procedure may have the 
furthest reaching and most sustained effects on the country. 
  The reform is ambitious in scope, and applying the provisions of 
Chile’s new Code of Criminal Procedure is fraught with difficulty.  In 
crafting workable procedures for operating the new system effectively, 
Chilean legal scholars have consulted international approaches to criminal 
procedure.18  In so doing, Chile should look to Japan.  Another Pacific Rim 
nation that has been propelled by rapid economic expansion, Japan also 
shifted from an inquisitorial criminal process to an adversarial system.19  
Furthermore, Japan’s criminal procedure has grappled with regulating the 
                                                 
12
  See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2005 – 2006, GROWTH  
COMPETITIVENESS INDEX RANKINGS AND 2004 COMPARISONS,  http://www.weforum.org/ pdf/Global_ 
Competitiveness_Reports/Reports/GCR_05_06/GCI_Rankings_pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). 
13
  Going It Alone, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 2003 at 41. 
14
  Luz Estella Nagle, The Cinderella of Government: Judicial Reform in Latin America, 30 CAL. W. 
INT’L L.J. 345, 379 (2000). 
15
  David Bosco, Santiago’s Aftershocks, LEGAL AFF.  67 (July/Aug. 2002); See also PAMELA 
CONSTABLE & ARTURO VALENZUELA, A NATION OF ENEMIES: CHILE UNDER PINOCHET (1991) (detailing 
repressive tactics used by the fascist government of General Augusto Pinochet, who ruled Chile from 1973 
to 1990). 
16
  Constitución Política de la República de Chile (Constitution of the Republic of Chile), 
https://www.presidencia.cl/view/pop-up-nueva-constitucion-texto.asp. 
17
  Democratic at Last, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 15, 2005, at 60. 
18
  See generally ANTONIO MARANGUNIC, MINISTERIO PÚBLICO OF CHILE, & TODD FOGLESONG, 
VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CHARTING JUSTICE REFORM IN CHILE: A COMPARISON OF THE OLD AND NEW 
SYSTEMS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2004) [hereinafter MARANGUNIC & FOGLESONG], http://www.vera 
.org/publication_pdf/254_498.pdf (analyzing conviction rates and procedural efficiency). 
19
  Mark D. West, Note, Prosecution Review Commissions: Japan’s Answer to the Problem of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 684, 687 (1992). 
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conduct of powerful public prosecutors.20  To ensure the success of Chile’s 
criminal procedure reform, Chilean legal officials must confront the issue of 
regulating prosecutorial discretion in charging cases.21  Japan’s unique 
solution to the problem—prosecution review commissions composed of 
laypersons22—should be studied by Chile’s legal reformers as an effective 
mechanism for regulating the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
  Part II of this comment examines Chile’s criminal procedure reform 
by tracing the roots of the reform and explaining the mechanics and the 
implications of the newly created system.  Part III analyzes the role of the 
national Office of the Public Prosecutor within the new system.  Part IV 
describes the recent experience of prosecutors under the criminal procedure 
reform and assesses the Office of the Public Prosecutor’s success in 
discharging its duties.  Part V examines Japan’s approach to prosecutorial 
discretion and its applicability to Chile’s justice system.  Part VI anticipates 
future challenges to Chile’s criminal procedure reform and proposes an 
approach for effectively managing prosecutorial discretion. 
II.  CHILE’S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM CREATES A JUSTICE SYSTEM 
MORE COMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRACY 
 The movement to reform Chile’s criminal justice system was rooted in 
popular perception that the colonial-style inquisitorial system, which had 
been in place throughout the twentieth century, was not compatible with the 
democratic society Chile hoped to achieve.23  Widespread reaction amongst 
the Chilean public to the human rights abuses of the Pinochet dictatorship 
also influenced the desire for a reformed criminal procedure, as did the 
inability of the Chilean state to safeguard essential individual rights.24  In 
addition to better protection for defendants, Chileans also were widely 
concerned about improving public safety and the efficiency of the criminal 
justice system.25  The reform of Chile’s Code of Criminal Procedure 
represents a massive effort by the national government, and with a total cost 
                                                 
20
  A. Didrick Castberg, Prosecutorial Independence in Japan, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 38 (1997). 
21
  Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousiño, Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems: The Rule of Law and 
Prospects for Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 323, 338-39 (1998).  
22
  West, supra note 19, at 694. 
23
  Abramson, supra note 1, at 2. 
24
  de la Barra, supra note 21, at 324.  
25
  Id. at 326. 
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estimated at U.S. $550,000,000,26 the reform is thought to be the single most 
expensive governmental endeavor in Chile’s history.27  
    
A.   The Criminal Procedure Reform Is Dedicated to Reconciling State 
Power with Individual Rights 
 
 Chile’s Ministry of Justice maintains that the stated goal of the new 
system is to resolve social conflicts in a way that is timely, transparent, 
impartial, accessible, and respectful of people’s fundamental rights.28  Put 
more simply, the reform is designed to create a modern justice system that is 
capable of efficiently reconciling the punitive power of the state with robust 
safeguards of individual rights.29  The new system aims to redress the 
deficiencies of the old Code of Criminal Procedure and conduct criminal 
trials openly.30  Trials under the new criminal procedure should be speedy 
(i.e.,  not subject to protracted delays).31  The new criminal procedure also 
emphasizes alternatives to imprisonment and has a greater focus on 
preserving defendants’ rights.32 
 The new framework stands in marked contrast to the former criminal 
procedure system.  Under the old system, a prosecutor took a police report 
regarding an offense and would conduct a sealed investigation.33  Then, 
sometimes years later, the prosecutor would make a decision as to whether 
enough information had been gathered to charge the defendant.34  The same 
prosecutor who had charged the defendant then became the judge in the 
case.35  Criminal defense practice consisted of technical motions without 
court appearances or a chance to confront witnesses.36  Almost invariably, 
                                                 
26
  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT OF CHILE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM 23 (2005)  
http://www.chileangovernment.cl/pdf/CriminalProcedureReform.pdf  (explaining the procedural reform in 
English) [hereinafter CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM]. 
27
  Abramson, supra note 1, at 3. 
28
  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 5. 
29
  Id. 
30
  Id. 
31
  Id.; see also MARANGUNIC & FOGLESONG, supra note 18, at 6 (criminal prosecutions examined in 
this research study indicated that ninety-six percent of cases involving an arrest were resolved within a 
fifteen-month period under the new system, as opposed to an eighty-seven percent resolution rate for the 
same time period under the old system). 
32
  See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 5. 
33
   Abramson, supra note 1, at 3. 
34
   Id.; see also James L. Bischoff, Note, Reforming the Criminal Procedure System in Latin America, 
9 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 27, 40 (2003) (“An incredible seventy percent of Latin American prison inmates 
are there awaiting trial.  Indeed, the length of pretrial incarceration often exceeds the maximum sentence 
the accused could receive if actually convicted of the crime for which he has not yet been indicted”). 
35
  Abramson, supra note 1, at 3. 
36
  Id. 
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defendants were found guilty, but sentencing decisions could be indefinitely 
withheld, often resulting in long-term detentions without formal 
determinations of guilt.37  The secretive nature of the process invited 
corruption, abuse of power, and nepotism.38  In design, the new system 
offers a vast improvement over the old criminal procedure.39  With its 
greater emphasis on due process and division of power between actors, the 
reform promises better protection of individual rights. 
B.   Chile’s Criminal Procedure Reform Is the Product of an Extensive 
Legislative Process 
  Propelled by the public’s demands during the 1990s for better 
protections for defendants and more efficient administration of justice, the 
Chilean Congress enacted legislation to reform the Code of Criminal 
Procedure.40  Beginning with Law 19.519,41 which established the Office of 
the Public Prosecutor in September 1997, and concluding with Law 
19.696,42 which established the National Public Defender in March 2001, 
Congress passed legislation over the course of five years implementing the 
new Code of Criminal Procedure.43  
  The process of installing the new criminal system has relied on central 
coordination and gradual implementation.44  The Commission on the 
Coordination of the Criminal Procedure Reform, comprised of the Minister 
of Justice who presides over the Commission, the Supreme Court Chief 
Justice, the National Prosecutor, and the National Public Defender, along 
with several other officials, coordinated the reform.45  Under the direction of 
the Commission, the reform was gradually implemented throughout Chile.46  
The reform’s implementation began in the most sparsely populated regions 
in December 2000 and culminated with its introduction in metropolitan 
                                                 
37
  Id. 
38
  Alejandra Matus, The Black Book of Chilean Justice, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 329, 331 (2002). 
39
  MARANGUNIC & FOGLESONG, supra note 18, at executive summary.  
40
  See Abramson, supra note 1, at 2. 
41
  Lydia Tiede, Commitment to Justice: An Analysis of Criminal Law Reforms in Chile 15 (U.C. San 
Diego, Ctr. for Iberian and Latin Am. Stud., Working Paper No. 22, 2004), http://repositories 
.cdlib.org/cilas/papers/22.  
42
  Id. 
43
  See Tiede, supra note 41, at 11 n.27 (listing the six relevant statutes from Chile’s Diario Official:  
Ley No. 19.665, Mar. 9, 2000; Ley No. 19.708 and Ley No. 19.665, January 5, 2001; Ley No. 19.519, Oct. 
15, 1999;  Ley No. 19.640, Oct. 15, 1999;  Ley No. 19.718,  Mar. 10, 2001; and  Ley No. 19.696, Oct. 12, 
2000). 
44
  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 9. 
45
  Id. 
46
  Id. 
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Santiago in June 2005.47  The reform has been implemented in five regional 
stages with an initial caseload of zero, meaning the new criminal procedure 
is not applied retroactively.48  Courts using the old system will continue to 
handle all crimes committed before that date.49  This approach was designed 
to avoid any overload or congestion left by the old system.50   
C.  Separate and Distinct Judicial System Personnel Roles Will Drive the 
New System   
 A variety of new mechanisms are designed to achieve the goals of the 
reform.  Foremost among these is the clear and strict division of authority 
among three separate entities: judges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors.51 
These three actors, tasked with new responsibilities, will in large part 
determine the reform’s effectiveness.  
 The role of judges under the new system is a dramatic departure from 
the earlier model.  Under the old Code of Criminal Procedure, there were 
seventy-nine judges throughout Chile who were responsible for investigating 
crimes, filing charges, and sentencing defendants in all of the criminal cases 
that passed through the nation’s judicial system.52  Under the new system, 
despite their objections, the responsibilities of judges have been radically 
curtailed.53  Further, judges themselves are now divided into two categories: 
supervisory judges (jueces de garantías) and oral criminal trial court judges 
(tribunales del juicio oral en lo penal).54  Under the new system, there are 
420 of the former and 396 of the latter.55  With more than 800 judges total, 
the new system represents a tenfold increase in judges to oversee Chile’s 
criminal trials.56  This massive increase in judicial resources is certain to 
impact the speed and efficiency of Chile’s trials, which early reports indicate 
are much improved.57 
 Supervisory judges, who are similar to magistrates in the U.S. system, 
are responsible for granting pretrial authorizations requested by the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office relating to actions that might impact a defendant’s 
                                                 
47
  Id. 
48
  Id. 
49
  Id. 
50
  Id. 
51
  Id. at 5. 
52
  Id. at 13. 
53
  de la Barra, supra note 21, at 329. 
54
  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 13. 
55
  Id. 
56
  Id. at 13, 15. 
57
  MARANGUNIC & FOGLESONG, supra note 18, at 13. 
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constitutional rights.58  Supervisory judges direct hearings during 
investigation and pretrial phases59 and are responsible for the controversial 
process of determining whether to release defendants prior to trial or to 
remand them to pretrial custody.60 
 The role of criminal trial court judges under the new system 
represents a departure from the earlier Code of Criminal Procedure.  Under 
the new system, trial court judges sit on three-member panels that hear oral 
arguments and are responsible for both the judgment and sentencing of 
defendants, as there are no juries under the Chilean system.61   
 Defense attorneys under the new system have a greatly enhanced role 
compared to their status under the old model.62  Created by Law 19.718,63 
passed in March 2001, the Criminal Public Defender’s Office (Defensoría 
Penal Pública) is composed of a National Defender and regional and local 
defenders spread throughout the country.64  As opposed to the previous 
system, where poorly trained law students could be assigned as counsel, 
public defenders under the new system are attorneys with a certified level of 
competence.65  Of the public defenders, 145 are government employees, and 
an additional 270 defense attorney positions are awarded by contract to 
private attorneys in a public bidding system.66 
 Finally, the responsibility for overseeing investigation of crimes, 
pressing charges, and prosecuting cases falls on the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor (Ministerio Publico). 67  Because the role of the prosecutor under 
the reform is so new to Chile, and prosecutors must now shoulder the burden 
of directing law enforcement and protecting public safety,68 the Prosecutor’s 
Office is under great scrutiny.  In order to achieve an effective criminal 
justice system, judges and defense attorneys must learn new skills and attain 
                                                 
58
  Abramson, supra note 1, at 4; see also CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 9. 
59
  Tiede, supra note 41, at 12-13. 
60
  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 13. 
61
  Abramson, supra note 1, at 3.  
62
  de la Barra, supra note 21, at 348-49; see also Abramson, supra note 1, at 3 (“under the old 
system, criminal defense practice consisted of filing highly technical motions, with no court appearances, 
chance for confronting witnesses or other opportunities for zealous, or any, advocacy”). 
63
  Tiede, supra note 41, at 17 n.44. 
64
   CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 17. 
65
  Tiede, supra note 41, at 17-18; see also Sofia Libedinsky, The Reform of the Criminal Justice 
System in Chile: From an Inquisitorial to an Adversarial System, Feb. 2005, at 3, 
http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=102833 (explaining that although a legal aid service 
had already existed, defense was provided by law students in the last year of their studies, cases were 
transferred frequently because students only worked for a six month period, and the quality of 
representation was low). 
66
  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 17. 
67
  de la Barra, supra note 21, at 332. 
68
  de la Barra, supra note 21, at 332-35. 
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competence in their roles under the new system.  One of the greatest 
challenges of the reform will be changing the legal culture in Chile with the 
same actors playing new roles.69  However, public prosecutors, new figures 
in the Chilean criminal system,70 may have the greatest challenge as they 
adapt to a role that has never before existed in Chile.71 
 
III. THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR MUST BE EFFECTIVE FOR THE 
REFORM TO SUCCEED 
 
 The Office of the Public Prosecutor has assumed some of the most 
fundamental powers of inquisitorial judges under the old system, as it is 
responsible for overseeing law enforcement and charging cases.72  Those 
responsibilities were formerly vested in a relatively small number of 
experienced judges with heavy caseloads, who were also responsible for 
reaching a verdict.73  In contrast, the new system consists of a relatively 
large number of inexperienced lawyers who manage law enforcement and 
seek convictions.74  It is difficult to determine how well they will respond to 
the challenge of meeting their new responsibilities.75 
A. The Office of the Public Prosecutor Is Novel to Chile’s Justice System 
  The Office of the Public Prosecutor was created through 
constitutional reform by Law 19.519 in September 1997.76  In 1999, the 
Chilean Congress passed Law 19.640, which set forth the responsibilities, 
operational guidelines, and limitations of the prosecutor’s office.77  The 
National Prosecutor (Fiscal Nacional del Ministerio Público), Guillermo 
                                                 
69
  de la Barra, supra note 21, at 333. 
70
  Id. at 332. 
71
  Mauricio J. Duce, The Role of the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Latin America’s Criminal 
Procedure Reform: An Overview 7, http://www.cejamericas.org/doc/documentos/reforma-mp2-ing.pdf (last 
visited  Jan. 13, 2006). 
72
  Tiede, supra note 41, at 16. 
73
  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 13. 
74
  Id. at 15. 
75
  See Bosco, supra note 15, at 69 (commenting that some Chileans “fear that ill-prepared 
prosecutors, in particular, will cause a breakdown in the system . . . it will be painful for judges to watch 
prosecutors stumble, particularly because public ire at resulting acquittals will likely singe the judiciary. 
‘Santiago will be a trial by fire,’ says Paulina Sanchez, a young magistrate at the capital”). 
76
  MINISTERIO PUBLICO, QUIENES SOMOS, QUE ES EL MINISTERIO PUBLICO (2004),  
http://www.ministeriopublico.cl/default.asp?cuerpo=31 (English translation of Public Prosecutor’s Office 
resources and functions available on Public Ministry’s website). 
77
  See Law 19.640, http://www.ministeriopublico.cl/default.asp?cuerpo=31 (last visited Oct. 10, 
2005). 
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Piedrabuena Richard, directs the Office of the Public Prosecutor.78  The 
office has 642 prosecutors, along with approximately 3000 staff members, 
who are distributed over sixteen regional prosecutors’ offices.79  The Public 
Prosecutor’s Office was appropriated the equivalent of U.S. $218,000,000, 
making it the recipient of nearly forty percent of the resources allocated by 
Congress to the reform.80   
 The most crucial element of Chile’s criminal procedure reform is the 
separation of duties between judges and prosecutors.81  Chile’s government 
emphasizes that the mission of prosecutors under the reform is to investigate 
criminal acts, determine punishable participation, prosecute criminal action, 
and adopt measures for protecting victims and witnesses.82  However, the 
government makes clear that “under no circumstances does the [Office of the 
Public Prosecutor] hear or adjudicate cases.”83  Prosecutorial duties have 
been completely separated from the judicial branch.84  The Office of the 
Public Prosecutor is entrusted with impartially discharging its new 
responsibilities, including deciding which cases to charge and which cases to 
dismiss.85  This power to select which cases to charge is commonly referred 
to as prosecutorial discretion.86     
B.  Prosecutors Are Entrusted with an Expansive Power of Discretion 
  Prosecutorial discretion, pursuant to Law 19.640, Title I, Section III,87  
and Article 248 of the Chilean Code of Criminal Procedure,88 vests 
prosecutors with the power to either charge or dismiss a case.  Termed “the 
discretion problem”89 by some commentators, there is concern surrounding 
the prosecutors’ newly acquired power.90   Under the old system, charging 
                                                 
78
  MINISTERIO PUBLICO, profile of National Prosecutor Guillermo Piedrabuena Richard, 
http://www.ministeriopublico.cl/index.asp (follow “fiscalia nacional” hyperlink, then follow “quien es 
Guillermo Piedrabuena Richard” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 12, 2006).  
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discretion only occurred in the sealed investigative phase, and the only 
people with influence over the decision to charge were judges, police, and 
lawyers with personal connections to judges or the police department.91  The 
potential for corruption was considerable, as there was little independent 
oversight into which cases were charged and which cases were dismissed.92  
Subsequent to the reform, charging discretion is vested in prosecutors, 
though with some judicial oversight.93  Prosecutors, however, may still 
dismiss charges administratively (referred to as archivo provisional or 
principio de oportunidad) and do not require judicial authorization to do 
so.94  The new system relies on an evolving relationship between prosecutors 
and supervisory judges in filing criminal cases.95   
  Ideally, the discretion now granted to prosecutors will produce more 
efficient case selection, reduce the overall caseload, and consequently aid 
judges in setting appropriate sentences.96  However, some judges have 
resisted having their authority curtailed and have asserted their influence in 
the sentencing process.97  This is expressly prohibited by the reform, as 
Article 80 of Law 19.640 explicitly gives prosecutors autonomy in directing 
criminal investigations.98  Determining which cases to prosecute remains one 
of the central responsibilities of prosecutors in an adversarial system.99 
Therein is the most dangerous power of prosecutors, according to former 
U.S. Attorney General Robert Jackson—charging individuals that they think 
they should punish rather than picking cases that need to be prosecuted.100   
  If Chile’s criminal procedure reform is to succeed, public prosecutors 
must competently and professionally discharge their duties.  Prosecutors will 
need to employ skillful advocacy and careful use of charging discretion to 
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meet their responsibilities under the reform.  Their success or failure will be 
apparent in the coming years. 
IV. PROSECUTORS WORKING IN THE NEW SYSTEM HAVE MADE 
 ENCOURAGING PROGRESS BUT MUST CONTINUE TO IMPROVE 
 Since the reform’s inception, prosecutors have struggled to fulfill their 
duties.101  Conflicts have arisen between prosecutors and supervisory judges 
concerning the proper balance of authority for directing investigations.102  
Public perception of the reform in Chile has reflected a concern that order 
will be difficult to maintain under the new system.103  Throughout the 
reform’s implementation, there has been popular and political pressure for 
prosecutors to deliver convictions.104  However, early results from the 
system’s implementation in Santiago are encouraging and demonstrate that 
the new justice system is more likely to resolve cases quickly and efficiently, 
producing convictions within a reasonable amount of time.105 
A. The Reform’s Early Results Have Been Encouraging 
 The first month of the new system’s implementation appeared to be 
successful.  Since the first arrests were made shortly after 12:00 a.m. on June 
17, 2005—the first morning of the reform in Santiago—the capital city has 
enjoyed relatively smooth enactment of the reform’s provisions. 106  During 
just the first month of the reform in metropolitan Santiago, more than 21,000 
cases were processed, nearly 5000 cases were quickly resolved, and over 
2000 public trials were conducted.107  President Ricardo Lagos commented 
that the early results were promising and reinforced the government’s 
optimism about the change in the judicial system.108  Contemporaneous 
government statistics also indicated a substantial drop in crime.109  Despite 
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these early positive indicators, public concerns remain regarding the 
perceived lenience of prosecutors, particularly with respect to reduced 
pretrial detention and juvenile crime.110  
 
B. New Procedures for Pretrial Detention Have Met with Public 
 Resistance 
 
 Chile’s new system of pretrial detention is controversial.  In the pre-
reform era, defendants were often held for years before being tried, resulting 
in backlogged court calendars.111  Chile’s system mirrored those in the rest 
of Latin America, where excessive pretrial detention is an enduring human 
rights problem.112  In response to this problem, the reform empowered 
supervisory judges to decide whether a detainee, once arrested, should go 
free or remain in protective custody.113  This particular feature of the reform 
has been met with criticism.  Chile’s President publicly attacked the policy 
of granting provisional liberty as being too lenient.114  Supreme Court Justice 
Marcos Libedinsky, however, defended the new authority of judges to grant 
provisional liberty and its foundation in the presumption of innocence, 
which is an important feature of the new reform.115 
 Presuming defendants to be innocent remains an alien concept in 
much of Chile, and the criticism of pretrial release reflects the deeply held 
public suspicion about some aspects of the reform.116  In response to 
criticism of the pretrial release policy, Chile’s government announced plans 
in September 2005 to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure and eliminate 
provisional liberty for criminal offenders.117  While much of the criticism 
was fueled by political considerations during an ongoing presidential race,118 
the willingness of the government to consider abandoning pretrial release of 
defendants less than six months after the reform’s enactment indicates the 
uncertainty surrounding the reform itself. 
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C. Responding Effectively to Juvenile Crime Is One of the Justice 
System’s Most Difficult Challenges 
 
 Juvenile crime is a pressing social problem in Chile.  Statistical and 
anecdotal evidence underlies the perception among the Chilean public that 
juvenile crime is one of the most widespread and destructive sources of 
crime in Chile.119  According to a recent study, between 1986 and 2002, 
arrests of juvenile offenders in Chile rose by nearly 400 percent.120  High-
profile violent home invasions by groups of teenagers in affluent coastal 
communities during the summer of 2005 reinforced the public’s perception 
that juvenile crime has become a severe problem.121  Under the old criminal 
system, minors were usually given lenient punishment by the courts.122  
Under a law passed by Congress in October 2005, minors between the ages 
of fourteen and sixteen can face five-year prison sentences for serious 
crimes, and minors between sixteen and eighteen years of age can receive a 
maximum ten-year sentence.123  While the maximum sentences are harsh, 
the legislation’s main goal is to improve rehabilitation programs for 
minors,124 and Chile’s government has constructed new “closed” and “semi-
closed” detention centers where juvenile inmates can receive counseling and 
treatment.125  However, questions about implementation of the new law 
remain, particularly regarding how prosecutors might use their charging 
discretion in cases involving juveniles.126 
 
D. Public Trials and Powerful Defendants: The Senator Lavendero Case 
 Is an Early Indicator of the Strengths and Weaknesses of the New 
 System 
 
In June 2005, Senator Jorge Lavendero of Chile’s Christian Democrat 
Party pled guilty to child molestation in open court.127  A powerful senator 
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from Region IX in Chile’s south, Lavendero was highly regarded for his 
longtime opposition to the Pinochet dictatorship.128  The senator’s trial took 
place in Temuco, a region of Chile where the criminal procedure reform 
went into effect in December 2000.129  Lavendero’s confession has been 
hailed as the reform’s first high-profile success.130 
 Many believe that Lavendero entered a guilty plea as a direct result of 
Chile’s newly reformed Code of Criminal Procedure.131  Under the old 
system, the trial would have been conducted in secret, consisting of written 
motions and arguments made to one judge with complete discretion to 
decide Lavendero’s fate.132  For decades, equality before the law was more 
slogan than reality, and influential Chileans were able to leverage their 
positions for favorable treatment by the court.133  Under the new system, 
Senator Lavendero was faced with the prospect of a damning public oral 
trial.  The charges were not secret, and an autonomous prosecutor was 
responsible for pressing charges.134  Despite his political power, Lavendero 
was forced to answer to criminal charges.135 
 Lavendero’s admission of guilt, however, was marred by a Supreme 
Court verdict ordering the dismissal of Region IX’s Public Prosecutor 
Esmirna Vidal for negligence in her investigations of Lavendero.136  Vidal 
was dismissed by Chile’s Attorney General following charges that she failed 
to properly investigate the case and provided inadequate protection to 
witnesses.137  Vidal’s dismissal underscores the reform’s early challenges 
and demonstrates that many lawyers still find the new trial format a difficult 
adjustment.138  Despite the difficulty lawyers have in adapting to the current 
system, the new Code of Criminal Procedure helps to ensure that powerful 
public figures are not above the law and represents an important step in 
strengthening Chilean democracy. 
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E. Chile’s Prosecutors Would Benefit from an External Review of Their 
 Discretion  
 
 The initial difficulties that have beset prosecutors in the early stages 
of the reform’s implementation demonstrate the complexity of prosecutors’ 
role under the new system.  In light of this complexity, Chile’s legal 
reformers would be well-advised to institute an external mechanism to 
oversee prosecutorial decision-making.  In creating such a mechanism, Chile 
should look to the example set by another Pacific nation that rapidly shifted 
from authoritarianism to democracy and modified an inquisitorial criminal 
procedure code into an adversarial system.  Chile should examine the 
solution adopted by Japan in constructing a system to manage the problem 
of prosecutorial discretion.   
 
V.   JAPAN’S PROSECUTION REVIEW COMMISSIONS ARE A USEFUL MODEL 
 FOR CHILEAN REFORM 
 
 The Japanese approach to regulating prosecutorial discretion is an 
instructive example for legal reformers in Chile grappling with the issue of 
properly administering prosecution.  In Japan, if a prosecutor decides not to 
indict a suspect in a case, the victim of the crime may request a hearing 
regarding the prosecutor’s decision.139  Hearings are conducted by 
prosecution review commissions (kensatsu shinsakai), sometimes referred to 
as committees for the inquest of prosecution.140  Even if there is no request 
by victims to review decisions to suspend prosecution, review commissions 
may investigate prosecutors’ decisions of their own volition.141  Despite the 
differences in Japan’s society and system of justice from those of Chile, 
Japan’s prosecution review commissions represent an innovative approach 
to a common problem—balancing the discretionary powers of prosecutors 
with public oversight. 
A.   Prosecution Review Commissions Are the Product of Japan’s 
 Unique Legal History 
 During the Meiji reforms of the late nineteenth century, Japan 
instituted a legal system based primarily on German and French models.142  
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Within the inquisitorial system, judges and prosecutors were given equal 
status in the Japanese Ministry of Justice.143  The power of prosecutors 
crested in the 1930s, a period marked by repression and nearly unchecked 
police power.144  After Japan’s defeat in World War II, the country’s legal 
system changed dramatically, with the judiciary made independent from the 
Ministry of Justice and prosecutors granted nearly complete 
independence.145  A new constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure were 
written,146 and the modern era of Japanese criminal law began.   
 Under the modern system, Japanese prosecutors are highly 
independent, free to indict highly placed politicians and empowered to 
suspend prosecution of those who have committed serious crimes.147  Article 
248 of the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure states that if “after 
considering the character, age and situation of the offender, the gravity of 
the offense, the circumstances under which the offense was committed, and 
conditions subsequent to the commission of the offense, prosecution is 
deemed unnecessary, public action may be dispensed with.”148  This 
somewhat vague statutory language offers Japanese prosecutors a great deal 
of discretion in deciding which cases to prosecute.149  The Japanese justice 
system has several procedures to guard against abuses of prosecutorial 
discretion.  Two of these procedures are administered by the government—
internal review of discretion by superiors within prosecutors’ offices and 
judicial review of prosecutors’ decisions.150   
 Internal review of charging decisions by individual prosecutors is 
common, as superiors must usually approve the prosecutors’ decisions.151  
Judicial review of prosecutorial decisions is much rarer.  Judicial review 
(saibanjo no junkiso tetsuzuki) is provided for in Article 262 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure,152 and allows those who object to non-prosecution in 
cases of abuse of authority or violence by a public officer to request that a 
District Court institute criminal proceedings against the accused.153  The 
procedure for complaints is complex, time consuming, and does little to 
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assure success for applicants.154  As a result, judicial review of prosecutorial 
discretion is infrequently used; from 1987 to 1990, 979 requests for review 
were received and only two resulted in prosecution.155 To supplement these 
two government-administered procedures, along with indirect legislative 
controls of prosecutors and the court appointment of special prosecutors, 
Japan utilizes prosecution review commissions.156 
 Each prosecution review commission consists of eleven members, 
selected by lot from the voter rolls in the local jurisdiction, and each member 
serves a six-month term.157  Commissions review decisions not to prosecute 
and may begin the investigation process in one of two ways.  The 
commission may receive requests from victims of crime, or it may initiate 
action on its own by a majority vote of its members.158  Each commission is 
empowered to summon and interrogate witnesses.159  After investigating, 
commissions determine whether indictment is proper or improper.160  A 
majority vote is necessary to determine whether nonindictment was proper, 
but a supermajority of eight of the eleven members is necessary to determine 
that the prosecutor should indict the suspect whose prosecution has been 
suspended.161  Currently, decisions of the commissions are advisory only.  
Article 41 of the Prosecution Review Commission statute states that the 
Chief Prosecutor shall “take proceedings for indictment, if he deems, after 
consideration of the decision, a public action should be instituted.”162 
Reforms proposed by Japan’s Judicial Reform Council, however, will make 
the decision of the commissions binding on prosecutors beginning in 
2009.163 
 After World War II, one of the Allies’ goals was the democratization 
of Japan, and the Japanese government was urged to pass the Prosecution 
Commission Law of 1948.164  Prosecution review commissions were 
expected to promote the goal of democratization in postwar Japan.  The 
statute creating the review commissions declares its purpose as guaranteeing 
“proper and fair execution of the right of public action by reflecting the 
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popular will.”165  Reportedly, General MacArthur saw the system as one 
element of a comprehensive plan to give the Japanese “safeguards to sanctity 
of individual liberty.”166 
  
B.   Japan’s Model Promotes Accountability and Accessibility 
 
 Three benefits of prosecution review panels are readily discernible: 
(1) the system is a watchdog over prosecutors; (2) the availability of 
registering complaints helps protect victims’ rights; and (3) the system 
encourages participation in the democratic process.167  When commissions 
review decisions made by prosecutors not to indict, the commissions act as 
an external social check on prosecutors’ discretion.168  This check helps 
ensure that prosecutors are diligent in fulfilling their duties, and that the 
decision not to indict is not a result of improper influence on the prosecutor.  
Even though decisions by the review commissions are not binding, the 
commissions create the possibility of negative publicity, and no prosecutor 
wants the torrent of media criticism that would result from ignoring a 
commission’s recommendation to prosecute.169  In this respect, prosecution 
review commissions help ensure that prosecutors are aware of the possible 
public backlash from abuse of prosecutorial discretion.170 
 Furthermore, prosecution review commissions help victims to have a 
greater voice within the justice system.  Although the recognition of victims’ 
rights remains inconsistent in Japan,171 victims’ ability to register complaints 
about prosecutors who refuse to indict allows them an avenue to contest 
improper use of prosecutorial discretion.172   
 Prosecution review commissions also encourage active civic 
participation in the legal process.  In Japan’s justice system, the 201 
prosecution review commissions around the country are the only opportunity 
for the public to directly participate in the criminal justice system.173  The 
commissions allow the Japanese public to play a direct role in the 
administration of justice, which is normally the exclusive realm of legal 
professionals.174  With the commissions, ordinary Japanese citizens are able 
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to exert direct influence on the legal system.  The introduction of the 
modified jury system in 2009 is evidence of the growing trend in Japan of 
expanded civic participation in the legal process.175   
C.   Japan’s Prosecution Review Commissions Have Limitations 
 For all of its advantages, Japan’s system has some shortcomings.  The 
principal limitations to Japanese commissions are their underutilization due 
to their public obscurity and a lack of enforcement power that impedes their 
effectiveness. 176 
 Prosecution review commissions have not been well publicized, and 
many Japanese citizens are unaware that they exist.177  Infrequent use of the 
commissions can be attributed to the system’s obscurity, as it is difficult to 
assert rights if those rights and a method to exert them are not well 
known.178  Furthermore, actors within the justice system do not have an 
incentive to better inform the public about the review commissions.  
Prosecutors have little motivation to inform citizens of a process that calls 
into question their own judgment.179  A review commission’s objection to a 
decision not to indict is a criticism of the prosecutor’s discretion, and 
consequently prosecutors themselves are not likely to promote the 
commissions.180  Private attorneys have no procedural role in review 
commissions, and Japan’s Ministry of Justice is too closely linked to the 
functions of the Prosecutor’s Office to promote a legal mechanism that acts 
as a check on prosecutorial power.181  As a result, the commissions are little 
known by the public and are not used often enough. 
 Furthermore, when prosecution review commissions are used, they are 
often not influential in modifying a prosecutor’s decision not to charge.182  
In the majority of cases, commissions have approved the suspension of 
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prosecution.183  According to a 1994 study, commissions dealt with 1691 
cases: 1583 cases initiated by victims or proxies; and 108 cases initiated by 
the commissions themselves.184  Of those cases, commissions made 
recommendations in 1288 of the cases, agreeing with the decision to suspend 
prosecution in 878 cases (68%), recommending the cases be prosecuted in 
209 cases (16%), and dealing with the remainder of cases in other ways.185  
The study indicated that prosecutors initiated prosecution 28% of the time 
when recommended by the commission.186  These figures demonstrate that 
commissions regularly agree with a prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute.  
Further, the study shows that even when commissions object to decisions not 
to prosecute, Japanese prosecutors have been reluctant to reopen cases.  The 
Justice System Reform Council’s proposal to make commission decisions 
binding187 will counteract that reluctance and give commissions more 
authority.  
 
D.   Japan’s System Offers a Practical Solution to the Problem of 
 Regulating Prosecutorial Discretion 
 
 Prosecution review commissions have been a useful mechanism in 
postwar Japan’s justice system for ensuring that prosecutors do not abuse 
their expansive powers of discretion.  Though the system has suffered from 
obscurity and under-use, prosecution review commissions have played an 
important role in regulating the conduct of Japanese prosecutors and 
promoting consistency in charging decisions.188  The commissions were 
particularly useful to Japan as it transitioned from its prewar inquisitorial 
system to its postwar adversarial system, which resulted in the complex 
modification of prosecutors’ role.189  In a society accustomed to inquisitorial 
procedure and unified authority, newly adversarial Japanese prosecutors 
remained vested with substantial power and discretion.190  To provide a 
counterbalance to that power, prosecution review commissions have 
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provided an avenue for ordinary citizens to challenge decisions made by 
public prosecutors.  With the advent of binding commission decisions in 
2009, the influence of the commissions will expand.191 
 Like Japan in the twentieth century, Chile in the twenty-first century 
has transitioned from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial system and 
has consequently reformed the powers of its public prosecutors.  Those 
prosecutors must balance the goal of successfully prosecuting cases and 
demonstrating effectiveness to the public while abstaining from heavy-
handed indictments or suspensions of prosecutions resulting from improper 
influence.  Japan confronted these same challenges, and its principal 
response was the institution of prosecution review commissions.  It is a 
solution that merits the attention of Chile’s legal reformers.   
 
VI. THE FUTURE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CHILE REQUIRES 
 MORE PUBLIC INFLUENCE ON THE PUBLIC PROSECUTORS 
 Chile’s Office of the Public Prosecutor wields a great deal of power 
under Chile’s new criminal procedure framework.  Chile has instituted 
mechanisms aimed at regulating prosecutorial conduct and enhancing 
victims’ rights, such as supervisory judges dedicated to ensuring due 
process.192  Criminal justice in Chile, however, is still controlled exclusively 
by legal professionals and does not provide for public participation in, for 
example, juries.193  Chile would be wise to adopt a version of Japan’s system 
of prosecution review commissions.  A Chilean system of prosecution 
review commissions would aid prosecutors in balancing order with restraint 
and would help the justice system combat official corruption and repressive 
law enforcement.  Furthermore, public prosecution review commissions 
would help democratize Chile’s legal system and make prosecutors more 
consistent and accountable in their decisions to indict and prosecute. 
 Tasked with pressing criminal charges, prosecutors shoulder a heavy 
burden under current reforms.  The Chilean public expects a high conviction 
rate, and prosecutors are faced with the dual priorities of delivering 
measurable results while adhering to the due process standards imposed by 
the reform.  Under the new system, prosecutors are more likely to produce 
convictions within a reasonable amount of time than in the old system.194  
Nevertheless, the opportunity remains for prosecutors to overzealously 
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charge cases.  Chile amending the Code of Criminal Procedure and 
providing for panels of laypeople to oversee prosecutorial charging decisions  
might have the effect of ensuring that prosecutors file charges properly and 
more effectively manage their duties to win convictions.  
 Prosecution review commissions would also serve the important goal 
of combating official corruption and police misconduct.  One of the most 
damaging facets of Chile’s old system of criminal procedure was the ability 
of influential defendants to negotiate their way out of criminal charges.195  
With public, oral trials and an independent judiciary, the new system has 
made this possibility much more remote, as the Senator Lavendero trial 
demonstrated.196  However, prosecutors still may be reluctant to prosecute 
highly placed officials, particularly if those officials have committed less 
serious crimes than the juvenile sexual abuse for which Senator Lavendero 
plead guilty.  Additionally, the Office of the Public Prosecutor is still under 
the direction of the executive branch, which may reduce the office’s 
independence and impede the aggressive prosecution of high-ranking 
officials charged with misconduct.197  
 To ensure that all Chileans, including public officials, are subject to 
the rule of law, Japanese-style prosecution review commissions could 
challenge decisions by prosecutors to suspend prosecution where strong 
evidence of criminal conduct exists.198  Even if the commissions’ decisions 
were not binding, as Japan’s are not, the prospect of a media barrage of 
negative publicity would encourage public prosecutors to consider the 
consequences of dropping charges against highly placed officials.199  
Further, prosecution review commissions would help combat police 
misconduct by exposing cases where suspects were arrested, but the 
evidence gathered by police was insufficient to support criminal charges.  
Prosecutors would be reluctant to publicize repressive law enforcement, but 
public panels of laypersons reviewing prosecutors’ decisions not to charge 
might be better sources of oversight in ensuring that police are not 
subjecting Chileans to arbitrary arrests. 
 Prosecution review commissions also have the substantial advantage 
of democratizing the legal system.  Chile’s legal reformers elected not to 
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adopt lay juries in criminal trials but rather have given the task of 
determining guilt to panels of three judges.200  While the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of the jury system are beyond the scope of this comment, 
juries do have the effect of democratizing the legal process by involving 
ordinary citizens in the most crucial functions of trial courts. 201  In the 
absence of juries, Chile would benefit from prosecution review commissions 
composed of laypersons and an infusion of popular participation into the 
justice system.  Providing an opportunity for civic participation would give 
the Chilean public a greater sense of empowerment and would help keep the 
reformed Code of Criminal Procedure responsive to the population it serves.  
 Finally, prosecution review commissions should be adopted to make 
public prosecutors more consistent and accountable.  Currently, individual 
prosecutors may subject their charging decisions to the scrutiny of superiors 
within their offices or to supervisory judges, but as explained above, 
prosecutors may administratively suspend prosecution of cases with no 
oversight at all.202  Additionally, to preserve high conviction rates,203 
prosecutors may decline to press charges in a case where the evidence 
indicates less than a sure victory.  Prosecution review commissions would be 
a useful mechanism for ensuring accountability and consistency in charging 
decisions. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 Chile’s criminal procedure reform is an admirable initiative with the 
potential to have a positive and persistent impact on the vitality of Chile’s 
emerging democracy.  Despite its early successes, the reform may be 
crippled without consistent and impartial prosecution of crimes.  In order to 
ensure the reform’s success, Chile should implement a version of Japan’s 
prosecution review commissions.   
 Japan, like Chile, adopted an adversarial legal system after 
abandoning its inquisitorial system.204 Japanese lawmakers introduced 
prosecution review commissions as a mechanism to balance the interest of 
powerful public prosecutors in applying their discretion against the interest 
of Japanese society in ensuring that prosecutors’ discretion is fairly and 
consistently applied.205  Chilean legal scholars have consulted international 
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approaches to criminal procedure in order to enhance the effectiveness of 
Chile’s reform.206  Japan’s model of prosecution review commissions 
presents a compelling international solution for Chile, a country seeking to 
regulate its powerful new prosecutors while democratizing its legal 
system,207 just as reformers in Japan sought to do sixty years ago.208    
  Prosecution review commissions offer Chile an opportunity to 
increase the stake of citizens in their new justice system.  Beyond being the 
recipients of better justice, Chileans would be able to take an active part in 
making sure justice was done. “A civilized system of law,” wrote U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice William Douglas, “is as much concerned with the 
means employed to bring people to justice as it is with the ends 
themselves.”209  Prosecution review commissions offer Chile’s justice 
system better means and better ends.  Chilean legal authorities would be 
wise to adopt them. 
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